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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of public sector unions on compensation
packages. The model of the compensation determination process incorporates
distinctiveinstitutional aspects of public sector labor relations, particularly
the differences in collective bargaining laws across states. The model is esti-
mated usingdata on over 800 municipal police departments. Our results indicate
that the effect of public sector unions depend critically on these institutional
features of the public sector. First, unionism thrives only in those states
with protective legislation. Second, in states where unionism has flourished,
unionism exerts a strong upward pressure on both union and nonunion compensation
packages. Cross section estimates for 1978 indicate that salaries of union and
nonunion departments in highly unionized states are some 30% higher than are the
salaries in states with low levels of unionism. However, no significant dif-
ference between union and nonunion salaries within states is observed.
Before—after estimates of the "state—wide union effect" are more
modest (9.9% to 18.1%). Finally, this "state—wide union effect" on union and
nonunion departments appears to 'be even more pronounced on fringe benefits than
it is on salaries. The net result is that in highly unionized states, a greater
proportionof the larger compensation packages is paid in fringe benefits.
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1050 Massachusetts Ave. Columbia Univeristy
Cambridge, MA 02138 713 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027In spite of well—known institutional differences between public sector
and private sector collective bargaining, many studies of the effect of unioni-
zation on public sector compensation have essentially followed the private sec-
tor model, estimating union effects by comparing the wages of organized and
unorganized workers or cities. For the most part these studies have found
rather modest union wage effects in the public sector. "The 'average' wage
effect of unionism in government... is roughly on the order of five per cent...
smaller than the average union wage impact in private industry."1 "The general
effects (of public sector unions) which have been measured are not huge."2
This study presents an alternative model of public sector union effects
on compensation which yields larger estimates of what unions do to compensation
in the public sector. The model incorporates two distinct aspects of public
sector labor relations that should affect unions' ability to raise wages.
First are differences in collective bargaining laws across states: the fact
that some states have duty—to—bargain laws that encourage unionism, while others
have legal environments that discourage or even outlaw bargaining among certain
groups of employees. Second, city managers, unlike private employers, are
charged with the responsibility of administering public policies. Where a state
has a duty—to—bargain policy then, municipal managers will not be in a position
to oppose unionism through aggressive anti—union campaigns of the type seen in
the private sector. We argue that because of these factors public sector
unionism proliferates in states with favorable bargaining laws, and that in
these states union wages 'spill over' to nonunion cities, leading standard union
wage equations to underestimate union wage effects.
We conduct our analysis using data on over 800 municipal police depart-
ments in 19T8 and a smaller sample in 1965 and l9T3. We find that differences—2—
in laws regulating police collective bargaining produce two polar sets of states
——thosewith high levels of bargaining between municipalities and their police
departments and those in which police bargaining is virtually nonexistent.
Furthermore, differences in the average police salaries (all else fixed) in
'bargaining' and 'non bargaining' states are on the order of 20 to 25%. By
contrast, comparisons of organized and unorganized departments within the
"bargaining"and "nonbargaining" states reveal little or no difference between
salaries paid in organized departments and those paid in unorganized depart—
ments.Our interpretation of theseresults is that in the absence of a
bargaininglaw virtually all departments will remain nonunion with wages
remaining at relatively low nonunion levels, but that in public sector environ-
ments where collective bargaining is the dominant mechanism for determining com-
pensation, there are greater spillover effects than are usually found in the
private sector.3
Direct and Threat Effects of Public Sector Bargaining
In this section we present a simple model of the inter—relation among
legal regulations, public sector unionism, and direct and 'spillover' effects of
unionism on compensation. The key prediction of our model is that in states
where union organization is high (because of favorable laws) unionism will raise
police pay in nonunion as well as in union departments. In states where
unionism is weak (because of unfavorable laws), unionism will have only a modest
effect on salaries in organized departments and no effect on salaries in unorga-
nized departments.
Consider first the situation in a state with laws favorable to collec-
tive bargaining among police. A city in such a state fa'es the three options
shown in Figure 1.—3—
Path A: It accepts organization and raises wages through bargaining
with the amount of the wage increases dependent on the union's economic or
political power relative to that of the city government.
Path B: It seeks to remain non union by paying union wages to discourage
organization; unlike private firms, city managers who are charged with the
responsibility- of administering public policies, cannot engage in expensive,
often illegal campaigns against unions to remain nonunion.
Path C: It does not accept organization immediately but also does not
match the increased levels in union departments. In a state with favorable laws
the city runs a great risk of becoming organized over time, producing a tran-
sitory and unstable state.
Since in the long run only nonunion cities that match union wages remain
nonunion, the indirect spillover effects of unionism are as large as the direct
bargaining effects.
Consider next the effect of unionism in states which lack a law per-
mitting collective bargaining. In the absence of a law, there will be no mecha-
nismbywhich employees are able to become recogni.ed formally. If workers
organizeaunion, managers may ignore any requests or demands to bargain on the
grounds that no agent has the authority to participate in the compensation
determination process. In such a setting cities are unlikely to be organized.
Where a union does exist, the city government will have much greater bargaining
power than the union, while cities which are not organized need not copy union















































































































































































































































































































shouldbe small and there should be no indirect spillover effects.
The spillover or threat nxdel just described yields several hypotheses
thatwill be tested in this study. First, formal collective bargaining should
be concentrated in states that have bargaining statutes or policies. Second, if
indirect "threat" effects of collective bargaining are equal in magnitude to the
direct effect of bargaining, salaries and wages in union and nonunion depart-
mentsin the states with bargaining laws will be equivalent, but at levels of
compensation exceeding the levels observed in states without bargaining laws.
Third, the novement of a state from little unionization toconsiderable unioni-
zation should greatly raise the average pay for all police in the state.
Fourth, low wage nonunion municipalities in a state with a bargaining law should
be highly prone to unionization in the future. Fifth, unionism should, have only
modest direct and no indirect effects on pay in states where collective
bargaining is legally discouraged.
Data
To test these hypotheses we have gathered 1978 compensation and unionism
data for over 800 municipalities with populations over 10,000. So thatwecould
also examine changes over time, we collected data for a smaller sariple of
just under 200 cities with populations greater than 25,000 for the years 1965
and 1913. For each year, we have obtained patrolman's minimum and maximum
salaryandthe average departmental salary.In1978 we have also obtained two
fringe benefit measures: per employee contributions to retirement systems, and
per employee contribution to health and life insurance programs.
To test how well the path model in the previous section describes the
effects of public sector unions on the compensation determination process,—6—
several variables are needed to describe the collective bargaining environment
at the municipal and state levels. Previous research on the public sector indi-
cates that a written labor contract is a better indicator of the presence of
the collective bargaining process than is a union local or association.5To
collect contract data, we conducted a survey in which we asked the following two
questions: "Does your city have a written labor contract covering wages, hours
and conditions of employment for police personnel?", and "What year was the
first written labor contract signed?" It is assumed that cities responding
affirmatively to the first question have been party to a police contract con-
tinually since the date given in response to the second question. Collective
bargaining for police department I in year t is defined by the presence of a
written labor contract (Cit; c=i,o) based on this survey.
From the municipal—level variable C, we derive the state—level
variable, PCst: the percentage of all municipalities in state s that have writ-
ten labor contracts in year t. Responses from 985 municipalities that answered
the contract questions are used to calculate PC in any given year.
Also critical to the path model are state—level collective bargaining
policies or laws. In this study, LAW is a dummy variable which equals one if
there is a policy in the state (as defined by statute, court rulings, or state
attorney general's opinions) providing that collective bargaining for police is
permitted in the state.6
Control Variables
Since LAW and PC are defined along state boundaries, it is important to
control for other state—wide characteristics that might influence police compen——7-.
sation. Other state characteristics included in the analysis are: four
geographic region durnx variables (northeast, north central, south, and west),
the percentage of a state's nonagricultural workforce who are public employees
in 1970, and the percentage of a states' nonagricultural workforce who are union
members in 1970.In addition to state controls, we include various municipal—
level characteristics: three government—type dummies (council—manager, mayor—
council, and commission), a central city dummy, population, per capita income,
total municipal revenue per capita. For a smaller sample of cities, information
was also available on: the salary paid to craft and kindred workers as a
measure of alternate salary available to police; serious crime rate; median edu-
cation level in the municipality; percentage black in the population; and land
area.7 When these additional control variables are included in analyses for
1978, the sample excludes smaller towns with populations between 10,000 and
25,000 and is reduced from just over 800 observations to under 200.
At the municipal level, ability—to—pay measures, such as income per
capita and municipal revenue per capita, are expected to have a positive effect
on salaries. A number of variables, such as central city, median education,
percent black, land area and population, are included as controls for differen-
ces in needs or tastes (and therefore demand) for police services The salary
paid to craft—and—kindred workers should affect the supply of workers available
for police work and should therefore have a positive influence on police
salaries. Because independent and dependent variables come from different
sources, the data do not always pertain to identical years across variables,
but all independent variables are matched as closely as possible with the years
of the compensation data.—8—
Thepath model in Figure 1 suggests estimation of several equations.
Unionization or Contract Equation
+ +
C.=f(LAW,STATE,CITY) (1)
is S S I
where C. =dumrr,rvariable for contract in city i in state s





Because the dependent contract status variable (C15) is binary we esti-
mate equation (i) with a logistic fanction. From our model we expect that the
LAW will be the major determinant of contract status of a city and, therefore,
of the proportion of cities with contracts in a state. Since LAW is a state—
level variable, however, there is danger that its effects could 'be overstated
due to possible omission of unobserved state effects correlated with LAW and
with unionization. To deal with this problem, we also estimate first difference
equations, examining the change in contract status within a city or state over
time. Such differencing removes unobserved fixed state effects:
=F(LAW,STATE ,CITY.,STATE, CITY.) (2)
where some state and city variables change over time and others do not.
Figure2 shows the changing pattern of contract status across states
over time and the relation between contract status and state laws. It documents
thesharp increase in the number of states with laws favorable to collective
bargaining and a concordant increase in the levels of unionization. What













































































































































































































































































































































































































no unionization in 1965toa dichotomous market with high unionization in most
(though not all) states with laws and little unionization in those without laws.
Logistic equation estimates of equations 1 and 2 are given in Table 1.
The coefficients on the LAW variable show that as hypothesized, passage of a
collective bargaining law does, indeed, lead to collective bargaining contracts
in police departments. Both the cross—section and longitudinal regressions find
significant positive effects on the law (change in law) variable. More detailed
analysis using panel data from 1955 to l9T8 on these cities reveals that much of
the growth in municipal police unionization occurs in the first few years after
the passage of state bargaining laws.8
Compensation Equation
+ +
mW a+bC +bPC +bCITY +bSTATE +e (3)
is li 2s 3 i 1 s is
Our model also suggests that in the frequent cases where state bargain-
ing laws have encouraged municipal unionization, wages of union and nonunion
departments are both raised. Therefore, in equation (3), we expect b2 to be posi-
tive and significant. In the absence of state legislation, the rare department
that has unionized will have only limited ability to raise wages. In highly
unionized states with favorable bargaining legislation, nonunion departments have
wages comparable to the wages in union departments because of the importance of
threat effects in these environments. With and without state legislation, union
and nonunion departments will have comparable salaries, so that b10. In this
analysis, b2 measures how much an increase in the level of state unionization
will influence both union and nonunion departments and is therefore our first
estimate of the threat effect. b1 is the additional wage premium enjoyed—11—
Table1: Logistic Coefficient Estimates of The Effect
of Bargaining LAW on Contract Statusa
(1) (2)






3. Other control '0 C
variables
log—likelihood —271.94 —94.783
a —assymptoticallynormal standard errors inparenthesis
b —controlvariables in 1978 cross—section equation included three region
dummies, two government—type dummies, a central city dumr, population,
income per capita, total revenue per capita, and the percentage of state
employment in the public sector, and the percentage of'stateemployment
that is unionized.
c —controlvariables available for 1978 and 1965 that are differenced
included change in population.
—indicatessignificance at the .01 level, one—tailed test;
**—indicatessignificance at the .05level,one—tailed test;
*—incicatessignificance at the .10 level, one—tailed test—12—
solely by union departments. The total effect of unionization on a union
departmentis given by the sum of b1 and b2.Estimates of how these different
kinds of union effects depend upon the presence of state legislation will be
obtainedby estimating equation (3) separately for the subsainpies of cities in
states with and without bargaining laws.
Table 2 presents estimated coefficients on key variables for the cross—
section equation (3)9 Entering the municipal—level contract variable (ci) as
the only union measure replicates the form of the equation most commonly esti-
mated to gauge the effect of public sector unions on compensation. In 1978 the
coefficient on C indicates that union departments receive 11% higher salaries
than do nonunion departments. When this equation is replicated for 1973 (column
6) and for 1965(column 8),one observes a result found in some other studies on
publicsector union wage effects: the simple cross—section union effect is
modestbut becomes larger in later time periods.10 The 1965 cross—sectionesti-
mateis in fact negative (—.029); in 1973, the contract effect is .OltO; and by
1978 it is .107.
In column 2 and 3, one observes that the PC and LAWcoefficients,
entered separately, are both significant and positive. The coefficient on PC is
nearly two and one—half the size of the CONTRACT coefficient in column 1. When
the three union measures are entered simultaneously (column )4), only the coef-
ficient on PC remains significant and positive. The PC coefficient from the
column )4 specification suggests that both union and nonunion police departments
in states that are almost entirely organized receive salaries some 30 higher





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ourinterpretation of why the LAW coefficient in columnis negligible is that
a bargaining policy which, for whatever reason, does not produce an increase in
the number of negotiated contracts for municipal police departments (as in
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Vermont) does not
itself raise salaries. An examination of regression diagnostics for multi—
collinearity for the equation in column I reveals, moreover, that the LAW and PC
(and therefore C) variables are highly collinear making It unlikely that we
would obtain well—defined estimates of both effects."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the column 1 specification indi-
cates that coefficient on C is no longer significantly different from zero once
PC is also entered. The simple contract (union) effect (column 1 specification)
usually estimated in studies of public sector union wage effects seems to be
entirely due to the greater representation of organized departments (those with
a contract) in highly organized states (those with high levels of nc). These
results indicate that salaries in nonunion departments are as high as those paid
in union departments.
Smaller samples, columns (5) through (9), give results for the smaller
sample of cities of 25,000 or more. The regression findings for 19T8 are not
changed appreciably when the more detailed set of municipal controls are added
that limit the sample to cities and towns with populations greater than 25,000
(column 5).
Similarly, for the cities in the 1973 sample, the results are much the
same. The modest positive contract coefficient (.o10) in column 6 is reduced to
zero once the state—level union measures are also entered in the equation—15—
(column 7). However, in 1973 the LAW as well as the PC variable affects
salaries, which may be attributed to its representing a period of transition or
sorting period from an environment with very little unionization (1965) to an
environment of union states and nonunion states (1978).
To obtain an estimate of the difference between average salaries in sta-
tes with and without laws in 1973, one can use the column 7 coefficients to
calculate:
b +b(Pc )— b(PC ).In1973 the average level of PC for the 27
LAW PCLAW PCNO LAW
stateswith a law was .520; the average value of PC for the 23 states without a
law was .122. This calculation indicates that the difference in police salaries
between the average state with a law and the average state without a law would
be iO.I% [i.e., (.063) +(.1o2)(.520)—(.1o2)(.122)].Again, the 1973 results
indicate that even as cities and states were in this period of transition,
"union states" had significantly higher police salaries than "nonunion states",
but that within states there was no difference between the salaries of union an
nonunion departments.
For 1965, when the state-level unionization measures, LAW and PC, are
entered in the equation (column 9), LAW has a significant positive coefficient,
while the PC variable obtains a large negative coefficient. As Figure 2 indi-
cated, police unionization by any state—level or municipal—level measure was not
yet an accepted practice. Only 4.8% of all departments had labor contracts.
Thirty five states had no police unionization (Pcro); and the maximum value of
PC in 1965 was only .375. The PC coefficient, while large and negative,translates into very small inter—state differences in average police compen-
sation. The positive LAW coefficient is also misleading. Supplementary analy-
sis which probe at the nature of the LAWcoefficientreveals that of the four
states with any kind of bargaining policies in 1965 (California, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) only California has high police salaries.
Taking all of these results as a whole, the cross—section estimates reveal no
consistent evidence of positive effects of any of the municipal or state—level
collective bargaining variables in 1965 ——a.period in which police unionization
was virtually nonexistant.
Splitting the sample by LAW
The cross—section estimates so far support our model's predictions that
unionized states have higher average police salaries than nonunion states, but
that no differences exist between the pay of union and nonunion departments
within any state. Table 3 goes a step further in testing our model of spillover
effects by examining contract coefficients obtained in separate equations for
law and no law subsamples. For our 1918 large sample there are enough obser-
vations to split the sample into states with and without laws and still have
contract and noncontract cities in both subsamples. Among no law states, the
contract coefficient is modest but positive (.055). In the previous equations
that included both the C and PC variables, the point estimates of the contract
effect had 'been slightly negative. Among no law states, union departments
do appear to earn a very modest positive salary differential. However, smili
differences in the PC variable between states in the no law sample do no signi—
ficantly affect average state salaries. Among states with laws, the coef——17—
Table 3: Contract Effects in States Without Bargaining Laws
and States With Bargaining Lawsa
IDependent Variable =NaturalLogarithm of Average Police Department Salary)
(1) (2)
No Law States Law States
Sample
Observations 206 616
1. Contract (ci) .055 —.023
(.o16) (.022)
2. Percent Contract (PC) .011 .295***
(.138) (.038)
3. Other Control Variables b
.523
a—standarderrors in parenthesis
b —othercontrol variables are those listed in footnotes h and din Table2.
—indicatessignificance at the .10 level, one—tailed test;
**— indicatessignificance at the .05 level, one—tailed test;
*— incicatessignificance at the .01 level, one—tailed test.—18—
ficients on C (—.023) and PC (.295) are both similar to the coefficients from
the total sample reported in Table 2 (Column 1 specification).
In evaluating the coefficients from the no law sample, it should be
noted that only fourteen of the 206 municipalities (6.8%) in no law environments
in 1978 have contracts. In contrast, 130 of the 616 municipalities (21.1%) in
states with laws in 1978 do not have contracts. The rare occurrence of a muni-
cipality having a contract in a no law state may well indicate that without the
protection of a bargaining law and without some provision or mechanism for
becoming organized, managers need not respond to employee demands for collective
bargaining. This explanation is also supported by the fact that in nine of the
fourteen cities that have contracts in no—law states, local legislatures adopted
a local ordinance providing for collective bargaining the year before the
negotiation of the first written contract. Interviews with managers from the
other five municipalities indicated that those cities have a strong union
influence in private sector employment that has made collective bargaining a
widely accepted practice in the area. Weirton, West Virginia and Huntington,
West Virginia are communities with strong influences from the steel workers and
mine workers respectively. Pascagoula, Mississippi (the only municipality with
a contract in a state in which police collective bargaining is explicitly ille-
gal by state statute) has a number of craft unions representing workers in its
dominant industry ——shipbuilding.Once these rare departments are able to
obtain formal recognition and a written contract, the power of the union to
raise wages would still appear to be quite limited. In these states, public
managers do not respond to any demands for collective bargaining; in the rare—19—
cases when formal bargaining does exist (usually with the protection of local
ordinances), public managers do not appear to respond to any appreciable extent
to demands during collective bargaining.
LongitudinalAnalyses
While these initial cross—section results lend support to our model the
question naturally arises: to what extent is the significant coefficient on PC
evidenceof a powerful union threat effect and to what extent does it reflect
omitted state characteristics? Just as the unionization equations could suffer
fromproblems of omitted variable bias, so too can equation 3. In particular,
ifE(e5PC)0,estimation of equation 3 will lead to an overstatement of the
coefficient on PC5. To deal with this problem we again hypothesize an omitted
city—specific effect (which may be the same for all cities in a given state) in
a cross—section equation for period 1.
in W1a1 +X1+ PC1 + +
wheree1 =111+ 01
+
X= a vector state—level andmunicipal level control variable
so that E(PC1e1) * 0, but that E(PC1 u) =0
By making use of data for a prior time period (period 0), one can difference out





where-4-—isa scaling factor that allows the effect of the omitted variable to









In the equation (6) specification, the coefficient on the change in PC, i, pro-
vides a direct estimate of the union threat effect that is not biased by the
possibly confounding effects of omitted variables. The equation (6) specifica—
tion further allows the effects of control variables to be different In the two
time periods.
When equation 6 is estimated, the results In Table 1 are obtained.
Column 1 presents the results when 1965 data are used as the base year; column 2
uses 1973 data for the base year. The coefficient on the change in percent
contract variable in column (1), is still positive and significant. The magni-
tude of the coefficient is only a little less than the magnitude of the
coefficients shown in the Table 2 cross—section results. However, when the 1973
data are used for the base year in column 2, the magnitude of the coefficient on
thechange-in--percentage—contract variable is only .099 ——aboutone—half the
magnitude of the column1coefficient, and only slightly largerthan the
correspondingstandard error. Still,the point estimate of the coefficient is
postive. The column 1resultssuggest that wage growth from 1965 to 1978 was
significantlystimulated by growthinstate—levelunionization over the period.
Thepost 1965 unionization spurt did not occur in states that previously had
high relative wages that were the result of some variable not captured by the
model. However, the column 2 results suggest that the additional union growth
that occured instates after 1973 stimulated wage growthless. One possible—21—
Table 14:Estimates of the Effect of State Unionization (PC)
ObtainedFrom "Before—After" Methodolo,ra
Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of 1978 Average Department Salaryl
(i) (2)
BaseYear Used 1965 19T3
C' 1.Change in Percent Contract .101 .099
(Pc1 —PC0) (.067) (.081)
2. Base Year Wage (w0) .180 .201
(.090) (.o6o)
3. Other Control Variables b b
.657 .699
a—standarderrors in parenthesis
b—Othercontrol variables include: changes in the natural logarithms of total
revenue percapita, income per capita, and population; changes in contract
status,and bargaining laws. The base yearvaluesof these variablesare also
entered ascontrols.Characteristics availableonly for one time period
include:threeregion dummies, two government type dummies, a central city
dumniy, and percentage of the state population that is in public employment and
the percentage of sta'e employment unionized.
—indicatessignificance at the .10 level, one—tailed test;
**— indicatessignificance at the .05 level, one—tailed test;
*— incicatessignificance at the .01 level, one—tailed test.—22—
reason is that the timing of unionization was selective with unions first orga-
nizing areas in which they could raise wages most. In both cases, the fact that
PC variable is positively correlated with salaries or salary growth suggests
that nonunion as well as unionized departments benefit from increased unioniza-
tion in the state environment.
Union Threat Equation
According to the path model in Figure 1 of Section II, a city in a
unionized environment can remain nonunion only by raising wages. A nonunion
city that does not match union wage gains is in the unstable state depicted by
path C of Figure 1. These cities run a particularly high risk of becoming orga-
nized. It is the strength of this threat that leads to the similarity between
union and nonunion salaries in the "union states."This additional hypothesis
of the path model suggests the following hazard function equation:
w w




where the expression on the right hand side of the equation is a standardized
measure of the difference between the wage in nonunion city I and the average
wage in state s.
To estimate equation (i) we calculated the number of standard deviations
a particular departments salary is away from the mean salary in its own state
(DEvsAL),thenestimated a logistic equation for the probability of negotiating
a first contract in 1978 (i.e., the hazard rate of unionization in 1978).12 The
independent variables include LAW, DEVSAL, and an interaction term LAW *DEVSAL.
The results from this analysis are shown in Table 5.The logit coefficient on—23-.
Table 5: The Effect of Low Salaries Within a State
on the Probability of Becoming Unionized, l9'T8-










a —Assymptoticallynormal standard errors in parenthesis
b —Othercontrol variables include those listed in footnotes b and d in Table 2.
—indicatessignificance at the .10 level, one—tailed test;
**— indicatessignificance at the .05 level, one—tailed test;
*— incicatessignificance at the .01 level, one—tailed test.the law variable in line 1 reinforces the results from the unionization equation
in Table 1. A municipality that does not have a contract at the start of the
year is much more likely to get its first contract during the year if It is In a
state with a LAW. From the logit coefficient in line 2 It appears that within
states with laws, a municipality is more likely to become organized during the
year if the police salaries it is paying at the beginning of the year13 are low
relative to other police salaries in its state. From the logit coefficient on
DEVSAL in line 3 of Table 3, it appears that paying relatively low salaries does
not lead to any increased risk of unionization in no law sates. It would
therefore appear that if a municipality in the states with bargaining laws do
not continue to respond to the threat of unionization, the department is likely
to begin to bargain collectively- to raise salaries.
Interviews provided further evidence on the threat of unionization if
salaries in nonunion departments slip below the level of union—salaries. For
example, out of thirty—one municipalities from Minnesota in this sample, only
Fairmont, Minnesota does not have a contract with its police department. In
discussing the determination of police salaries in this town, a management
representative of Fairmont said he has to match the salaries and benefits of the
unionized departments, adding: "Any one of these years, if our police don't
like the [compensation] package..., we're going to have collective bargaining."
The threat effect also appears to operate when police unionization Is at
somewhat lower levels as well. A management representative from Centerville,
Ohio (PC =.60In 19T8) wrote on our contract status survey-: "Of all the cities
with a population over 5,000 in the Dayton area, Centerville is the only one—25--
withoutunion representation for the police department. Management is
constantly striving to keep salary levels and work procedures current so as to
give no reason for the officers to seek formal representation." While this last
response indicates that the threat effect in Ohio operates within regions or
SMSAs (as suggested by Ehrenberg and Goldstein)1 the presence of a threat
effect is certainly supported by such comments.
Fringe Benefits
One additional aspect of how public sector unionization affects the corn—.
pensation determination process can be addressed with our data: the effect of
the various measures of public sector unionization on fringe benefits. For
1978, we also obtained data on employer contributions to retirement and
insurance programs. While detailed change—over—time analyses are not possible,
the cross—section compensation equations of Section IV can be replicated using
the natural logarithm of fringe benefits per employee as the dependent variable.
Table 6 presents the coefficients of the three measures of public sector
bargaining, C, pc, and LAW, in fringe benefit equations. The column 1 speci-
fication replicates the basic average salary equation (Table 2, column 14),but
with a slightly reduced sample. The change in sample again does not affect the
basic result: states with high levels of unionization (PC9) have relatively
high salaries, but within states there is no significant difference between the
salaries in contract and non contract cities. Column 2 estimates an equation
for the determinants of total compensation (defined as salary plus fringe
benefits). The PC coefficient in the column 2 total compensation equation is



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 would indicate a somewhat larger effect of state unionization on fringe benefits
than on salaries. The results from the fringe benefit equation in columns (3)
through (6) also support the hypothesis that state unionization measures have a
larger effect on fringe benefits than on salaries. Absent any state—level
measures of unionization, contract cities appear to pay significantly higher
fringe benefits than non contract cities. Once PC is also included (column 6),
one sees the same pattern observed in the salary equations in Table 2: uninici—
palities in states with high levels of unionization pay significantly higher
fringe benefits than do iminicipalities in generally 'nonunion' states but no
significant difference between fringe benefits paid in contract and noncontract
municipalities. Moreover, the PC effect on fringe benefits (column 6) is nearly
double the effect of PC on salaries. These results further suggest that cities
in states with high levels of police unionization have compensation packages
more heavily weighted toward fringe benefits than salaries. In column (T), the
ratio of fringe benefits to total compensation is used as a dependent variable
to illustrate this point more directly. The coefficient on PC is positive and
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that when a state is
entirely unionized (PC=l.O), municipal police departments in the state will have
2.3% more of their compensation package made up of fringe benefits than do
police departments in virtually nonunion states (pc=o.o).
Conclusion
The model developed in this paper and the various empirical equations
estimated to test that model suggest that the effect of unionization on compen-
sation in the public sector depends on a number of environmental and institu-
tional features:—28—
1. In environments where unionization is rare in the public sector
(i.e. in states which do not have legal provisions permitting
bargaining), unionization has little impact on compensation. This
principle is illustrated by the absence of any sort of union
effect on compensation in 1965 in the United States when only 14.8%
ofall municipal police departments engaged in collective
bargaining and only four states had any legal provisions for
collective bargaining. This principle Is also illustrated by the
very modest Impact of collective bargaining in 1978 in states
without bargaining laws.Inthese environments, only 6.8°of all
departmentsbargained (almost always withthe protection of
municipal—level bargaining ordinances), and the "union effect" on
salaries here was 5.5%.
2. In environments where collective bargaining Is the dominant mecha-
nism bywhichcompensation is determined(usually in states with
protectivelegislation), unionization exerts a strong upward
pressure on salaries on both union and nonunion departments.
Because of the threat effect of unionization on salaries in nonu-
nion departments, a simple comparison of salaries in union and
nonuniondepartments does not reveal the full "union effect." Our
cross—sectionestimates for 1978provide an upper bound of the
estimateof the effect of unionization on salaries in union and
nonunion departments (29.7). Our "before—after" estimates of
this "union effect" are somewhat more modest (9.9% to 18.1%).—29—
While police departments in highly unionized states pay much
higher salaries than do departments in nonunion states, there
appears to be no salary differential enjoyed solely by unionized
departments in the highly organized states.
3. Finally, the "union effect" on fringe benefits appears to be even
greater than the effect on salaries. The net result is that in
— —— .s.t. I,iiUILLUI1.LZU J)1•Q)UILO11 UI LIi U1UJ)CI1
sationpackages is paid in fringe benefit contributions to health
and retirement plans.
The results here suggest the value of developing models specific to the
public sector for analysing union wage effect rather than simply replicating
models used in the private sector. They also point out certain interesting
puzzles, which merit further attention. In particular, while bargaining laws
almost always lead to increased municipal organIzation, there are still six sta—
tes where bargaining policies have not lead to a majority of the states' munici-
palities being organized. While these six states (Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Vermont) have "weaker" meet—and-confer sorts of
laws, other states with these weaker provisions have seen significant increases
in the proportion of police departments that harain. And finally, if' municipal
organization generally follows the passage of state laws, how do we concep-
tualize the kind of union strength in the state that may lead legislators to
enact such favorable statutes?—30—
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